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A B S T R A C T
Double regulation of carbon emissions is a key policy concern in the context of climate change mitigation. The
existing literature on double regulation in an emissions trading system (ETS) context has largely focused on the
direct type (when, e.g., an ETS and a carbon tax cover the same entity) and has not yet discussed the indirect
type (when, e.g., the ETS and carbon tax cover two related entities in the same production-consumption chain).
This paper seeks to contribute to the literature by identifying ‘indirect double regulation’ (ETS & tax) on the coal-
ﬁred generation in the EU and China. Speciﬁcally, we scrutinized legal documents associated with the coal-ﬁred
power and further presented the quantitative evidence of ‘double carbon costs’. From the Law & Economics
analysis of ‘indirect double regulation’, we derived implications of ‘indirect double regulation’ for the abatement
of coal-ﬁred power sector in its own jurisdiction and – after a hypothetic linkage between the EU ETS and
Chinese national ETS – for its linked partner. In response, policy suggestions are provided to mitigate potential
competitive distortions but should diﬀerentiate distortions by sources.
1. Introduction
China and the European Union (EU) account for 39% of global
carbon emissions in 2015, and the power sector has so far been the
largest source of carbon emissions in both jurisdictions (State Grid
Energy Research Institute and Yingda Media Investment Group, 2014;
Olivier et al., 2016; Eurostat, 2016). Further, coal ranks second after oil
as one major primary energy input and plays a major role for power
generation in both the EU and China (China electricity council, 2017;
Sandbag, 2017). Therefore, reducing carbon emissions in the coal-ﬁred
power generation is crucial to climate mitigation eﬀorts, and coal-re-
lated carbon regulation will be critical in determining whether or not the
Greenhouse Gas (GHG) targets can be met.
Emissions trading system (ETS) is the cornerstone of climate policies
in both jurisdictions (European Council, 2014; NDRC, 2016). This
market-based approach to mitigate GHGs constitutes a cost-eﬀective
way to ﬁght global warming. To promote a ‘low-carbon coal-ﬁred
power system’,2 coal-ﬁred generators in both jurisdictions are covered
by emissions trading (i.e. the EU ETS and future Chinese national ETS).
Meanwhile, both carbon ETSs coexist with other climate instruments
that directly regulate or indirectly aﬀect carbon emissions of the ‘ETS-
covered entities’, leading to a complex climate policy mix (Sorrell and
Sijm, 2003) and potential ‘double carbon regulation’ (hereafter ‘double
regulation)’.
Double regulation is a key policy concern in the context of climate
change mitigation and generally refers to ‘signiﬁcant impacts of policy
interactions’ when the aﬀected groups pay twice for reducing the same
emissions. Within the context of an ETS, diﬀerent double regulation
issues may bring varied eﬀects since diﬀerent co-existing policies give
rise to similar, complementary or in some cases opposite incentive
structures in terms of carbon abatement. Some co-existing instruments
may incentivize ‘long-term investment in low-carbon technology’
(Braun et al., 2010; Lanzi and Sue Wing, 2011; Rey et al., 2014) and
thus improve dynamic eﬃciency of an ETS3; others may raise aggregate
compliance costs while not contributing additionally to abatement.
There are varied examples of double regulation on this matter, and a
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striking one is the double regulation (double cost burdens) between the
carbon ETS and the carbon tax4 that can occur in both direct and in-
direct manners. ‘Direct double regulation’ has been extensively discussed
in the literature and takes place when both instruments (the ETS and
carbon tax) are imposed at one party on consuming the same energy
products for the same purpose (i.e. to incentivize abatement). However,
‘indirect double regulation (hereafter: IDR)’ will arise when the ETS and
carbon tax cover two related entities in the same production-consumption
chain (e.g. electricity producers and consumers). This type of double
regulation has not yet been recognized in the literature. If the carbon
tax or ETS cost is passed downstream along the vertical production-
consumption chain, economic actors (e.g. electricity consumers) will be
directly regulated by one policy (e.g. carbon tax on the consumed
electricity) and indirectly aﬀected by the other (e.g. the electricity price
inﬂated by generators that are covered by the ETS), resulting in ‘IDR’.
Admittedly, legally speaking, it does not constitute double regula-
tion since the co-existing instruments (tax & ETS) concern two separate
parties. Nevertheless, the legal incidence5 or the legitimacy of policy mix
(i.e. carbon tax and the ETS) is not the only concern. The ﬁnal economic
burden (economic incidence) of the policy instruments and the abate-
ment cost structures it incentivizes will determine whether the instru-
ments function eﬀectively. Thus, the (double) cost burden created by
the IDR remains crucial to address the question whether the current
regulatory framework could incentivize eﬃcient GHG abatement.
As was analyzed above, the existing literature on double regulation
in the ETS context has largely focused on the direct type (see, e.g.,
Johnstone, 2003; Sorrell, 2003; Sorrell and Sijm, 2003; Sijm, 2005; Ellis
and Tirpak, 2006; Jakob-Gallmann, 2011; Chiquet, 2015; Schneider
et al., 2015) and has not yet identiﬁed the indirect one. Further, the
economic incidence of a single instrument (e.g. tax or the ETS) has been
extensively discussed, but – after the introduction of a second instru-
ment – the ‘economic incidence’ of double regulation in terms of carbon
abatement has not yet been suﬃciently discussed. Moreover, despite
the extensive literature on the climate policy interactions in the EU
context (see, e.g., Río, 2009; Braun et al., 2010; Egenhofer et al., 2011;
Lanzi and Sue Wing, 2011; Capozza and Curtin, 2012; Lecuyer and
Quirion, 2013; Lehmann and Gawel, 2013; Gawel et al., 2014; Rey
et al., 2014; Böhringer et al., 2016), scarce study has examined the
climate policy mix in China, let alone its intricate policy interactions.
Besides, few studies on double regulation within the context of the ETS
barely raise the complications when the ETSs are to be linked.6
In light of the gap in the literature and the need to facilitate
abatement with regard to coal-ﬁred generation, this paper focuses upon
‘IDR in the EU and China’, particularly, when the upstream or down-
stream side of coal-ﬁred generators (ETS-covered entities) is covered by
a carbon tax or quasi carbon tax. A ‘quasi carbon tax’ (e.g. energy tax) is
not explicitly imposed on the carbon content of the taxed item, but it
will impact emissions/abatement and thus could be economically
equivalent to a ‘carbon tax’. Further, this paper adopts a
Law& Economics perspective to better understand IDR, which rests
upon intricate incentive structures and equally complex ‘legal details’
that may be fully understood only if a holistic view is taken.
Speciﬁcally, a cost-and-beneﬁt approach is employed to examine the
abatement incentive structure of coal-ﬁred generators, and thus to
identify environmental eﬀectiveness and eﬃciency implications of IDR
for its own jurisdiction and potential linking partner.
The paper is structured into ﬁve sections. Section 2 identiﬁes IDR in
both jurisdictions by examining the carbon regulatory framework of
coal/coal-ﬁred power and further presents quantitative evidence on the
ensuing ‘double carbon cost burdens’. The abatement incentive struc-
tures of coal-ﬁred generators in both systems are examined in Section 3
(before linking) and Section 4 (after linking) to assess whether and how
‘indirect double carbon regulation’ will aﬀect the transitioning to a low
carbon coal-ﬁred power system. Meanwhile, the ‘double carbon costs’
(in terms of each megawatt-hour of coal-ﬁred power) in both jurisdic-
tions are compared to show the asymmetric competitive eﬀects of IDR.
Section 5 summarizes the main conclusions and proposes potential
policy solutions as well as future research suggestions.
2. Examining the carbon regulatory framework for coal-ﬁred
power: evidence of IDR
Double regulation (‘double counting’ included) has been discussed in
diﬀerent contexts but attached with multiple and ambiguous inter-
pretations. Speciﬁcally, double counting occurs when a single unit of
GHG emissions or emissions reduction is counted twice towards at-
taining mitigation pledges or ﬁnancial pledges (Sorrell and Sijm, 2003;
Schneider et al., 2015). ‘Double regulation’, however, is a much broader
concept that extends (beyond ‘counting’) to the ‘signiﬁcant impacts of
policy interactions’ and can arise in many diﬀerent manners.
According to the literature, double regulation within an ETS takes
place in two main ways. First, double regulation may occur when the
same unit of emissions or emission reductions is counted twice at two
separate parties within the same regulatory system. Striking examples
include the ‘double counting of electricity and heat emissions’ in the
China ETSs (Chiquet, 2015) and the potential double counting between
the Certiﬁed Emission Reductions (CERs) and Emission Reduction Units
(ERUs) under United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC) (Schneider et al., 2015; UNFCCC, 2015). Second,
double regulation will take place when the same emissions or emission
reductions are counted twice at one party under two separate reg-
ulatory frameworks. For instance, ‘double cost burdens’ will arise from
the co-existence between the EU ETS and instruments promoting energy
eﬃciency (EE) or renewable energy (RE) (Sorrell, 2003; Sijm, 2005;
Rey et al., 2014).
A third form double regulation that has not yet been acknowledged
and discussed in literature regards the abatement obligations or re-
wards given to two related parties (in the same vertical production-
consumption chain) under two regulatory frameworks. An example of
this is the IDR in the EU and China that will be elaborated upon below.
It arises from the coexistence between the ETS (imposed on coal-ﬁred
generators) and a ‘carbon tax’ or energy tax – associated with coal or
coal-ﬁred power – that is charged on the upstream (generation) or
downstream (consumption) side of coal-ﬁred plants. Such a tax is ex-
amined since it will aﬀect the abatement incentive structures of coal-
ﬁred plants. This is explained as follows.
2.1. ‘Carbon tax’ on coal and coal-ﬁred power
Currently de jure there is no carbon tax in China nor at the EU level
imposed on the carbon content of coal or coal-ﬁred power,7 and im-
posing such a tax on the generation or consumption of coal-ﬁred power
4 Carbon tax refers to the taxation that is explicitly imposed on carbon content of the
taxed item (e.g. fuel) for primary purposes of incentivizing abatement.
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) deﬁned ‘taxation’
as ‘any compulsory and unrequited payment’ to general government, which is diﬀerent
from ‘charges’ or ‘fees’ that are paid to government in return for services (OECD, 2001,
pp. 15–16; Xu, 2012, pp. 305–306; Milne, 2014, p. 8). In this paper, ‘taxation’ is inter-
preted in a broad sense and thus encompasses ‘charges’ and ‘fees’ (to government) as well.
5 The ‘legal incidence (or burden)’ of tax (i.e. whether it is directly collected on buyers
or on sellers) has no eﬀect on the ‘economic incidence’ of the tax – the respective shares of
the tax burden borne by consumers and producers. See Frank (2007) p. 50, Griﬃths and
Wall (2008) pp. 57–58.
Carbon ETS costs of the ETS-covered entities (e.g. generators) could also be passed on to
non-ETS-covered entities (e.g. downstream power consumers). See, e.g., IEA (2003),
Frondel et al. (2012) pp. 105–106, Schröder et al. (2013) p. 2, Bönte et al. (2015).
6 Two ETSs are linked if one country's allowance can be used, directly or indirectly, by
a participant in the other country's scheme for compliance purposes. See Haites (2004) p.
5.
7 This paper merely discusses taxes on EU level, though on member state level there
exist carbon taxes (e.g. in Finland, Ireland and Sweden).
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remains unclear in both jurisdictions. In 2011, European Commission
presented a proposal to restructure the taxation of energy products by
taxing energy in a way that reﬂects both its CO2 emissions and its en-
ergy content. But the proposal was withdrawn by the Commission,
following the unsuccessful negotiations between the EU Member States
in the Council (European Commission, 2011a, 2011b). In China, the
resistance to a carbon tax has been stronger than anticipated as it gave
rise to strong concerns about adverse impacts on the economic devel-
opment, international competitiveness and social distributional com-
plications (Zhao, 2014; Ideacarbon, 2016a). According to China's
former Finance Minister, Jiwei Lou, a carbon tax will not be separately
introduced in China but may be implemented as one sub-item of a tax
within the current arrangements, e.g. resources tax or environmental
tax (Ideacarbon, 2016a).8 Also, it is generally believed that a carbon tax
in China may be imposed on the non-ETS-covered entities after 2020,
mainly complementing the coverage of the ETS (Ideacarbon, 2016b).
While a de jure carbon tax remains uncertain in both jurisdictions,
‘energy taxes’ (or quasi ‘energy taxes’) are imposed on the vertical
production-consumption chain of coal-ﬁred power. Such excise duties
directly impact coal use and coal-related carbon emissions and are thus
to a certain degree similar to a ‘carbon tax’ on coal or coal-ﬁred power.
Therefore, they could be deemed as ‘de-facto carbon tax’ or ‘quasi
carbon tax’ (see Table 1).
In the EU, the Energy Tax Directive (ETD, Directive 2003/96/EC),
adopted in 2004, sets the minimum energy tax rate for the energy
products used in transport, the production of heat and the consumption
of electricity (coal-ﬁred power included) (Council of the European
Union, 2003). Consumption of electricity from renewable origin (e.g.
solar and wind power) may enjoy total or partial exemption (Council of
the European Union, 2003). Further, energy products used for the
production of electricity (e.g. coal) are exempt from the ETD. Ad-
ditionally, it has to be stressed that the EU ETD is energy-input neutral.9
There is no comparable tax measure comparable to the EU's ETD in
China that explicitly pursues environmental protection or eﬃcient en-
ergy use. But it is generally argued that a quasi ‘energy tax’ is implicitly
embodied in other taxes, mainly the resources tax and consumption tax
that are levied on energy products and incentivize eﬃcient energy use
(Xu, 2012; Liu and Sun, 2014).10 While the consumption tax is currently
levied on energy resources such as gasoline and diesel and does not yet
extend to coal, the resources tax is the main tax measure that is cur-
rently imposed on coal at coal plants, i.e. coal mine operators (State
Administration of Taxation, 2015). Consequently, the Chinese resources
tax (imposed on the coal plants) is the only de-facto tax item that is
comparable to the energy tax in the EU in the sense that both tax
measures incentivize abatement at coal-ﬁred generators.11
2.2. IDR between the ETS and ‘carbon tax’
As postulated above, the energy tax (on coal-ﬁred power) in the EU
and the resources tax (on coal) in China could be deemed as ‘de-facto
carbon tax’ in the sense that it puts an additional cost burden on coal
ﬁred power generation. These tax measures may therefore overlap with
the ETSs and give rise to IDR, as the ETSs directly cover the coal-ﬁred
plants in both jurisdictions.
Although the EU ETS applies to the large-scale production of elec-
tricity and heat and is directly linked to carbon emissions, there is re-
latively – though little – direct target group overlap between the two
instruments (the ETS and the ETD) at both sides of generation and
consumption. On the one hand, electricity end users (if not in the ex-
empt sectors) will be covered twice for consuming the same electricity
by both the ETS and the ETD (double carbon costs) (Rey et al., 2014).12
On the other hand, the use of coal for electricity generation by coal-
ﬁred power plants is exempt from the ETD (to avoid direct double
regulation) (Council of the European Union, 2003).
Granted that such a ‘direct double regulation’ is avoided, still, there
is ‘indirect double regulation (IDR)’ that has not yet received suﬃcient
attention but has been embodied in the production-consumption chain
of coal-ﬁred power. This is because, on the one hand, coal-ﬁred power
consumers are required to pay directly the energy tax under the ETD for
the consumption of coal-ﬁred power (see Fig. 1 (business) and Fig. 2
(non-business)).13 On the other hand, coal-ﬁred power plants – covered
by the EU ETS – have passed the carbon cost to coal-ﬁred power con-
sumers by inﬂating the price of coal-ﬁred power, which has been ex-
tensively discussed in the literature (see, e.g., IEA, 2003; Frondel et al.,
2012; Schröder et al., 2013; Bönte et al., 2015). Speciﬁcally, in line
with the methodology adopted by Weishaar (2017), we measured the
‘ETS cost burdens’ imposed on each megawatt-hour of coal-ﬁred power
in the high-emitting EU member states (see Table 3). This is done by
multiplying the ‘emissions intensity for coal-ﬁred generation’ (Table 2)
and the ‘annual EUA prices’. The average ‘emissions intensity for coal-
Table 1
A comparison of ‘carbon tax’ (on coal and coal-ﬁred power) between the EU and China.
Source: Council of the European Union (2003), State Administration of Taxation (2015), European Commission (2016).
China EU
On coal (produced/consumed to produce
electricity)
Ad-valorem tax; N/A (at coal plants);
imposed on coal plants when coal is sold; exempted (at coal-ﬁred generators).
tax rates: 2–9% (varied in diﬀerent
provinces, see Fig. 3).
On electricity (coal-ﬁred power included) N/A Ad-Quantum tax;
minimum tax rates (EU-wide): 0.5 euro/MWh (business use); 1.0 euro/MWh (non-
business use).
Further, eﬀective energy tax rates on electricity in diﬀerent member states vary, see
Figs. 1 and 2 (with diﬀerent exemptions).a
a For instance, in Germany, electricity consumers exceeding threshold may get tax reductions through reimbursement. Exemptions to electricity tax include, inter alia, the manu-
facturing sectors in various production processes (electricity used for electrolysis, production of glass, ceramics, fertilizers, metal production and processing, as well as chemical
reduction, since 2006). See Flues and Johannes (2015).
8 Currently there exists no ‘environmental taxation’ in strict sense in China.
9 Energy tax is not imposed on the energy content or carbon content of the taxed items
in the EU. See European Commission (2011b), Rey et al. (2014) pp. 11–12, 47.
10 Other types of local coal-related fees are not discussed since they are not standar-
dized, oftentimes charged repeatedly and are likely to be integrated into a uniﬁed re-
sources tax during the current coal resources tax reform. See China Coal Net (2009), Daily
Economic News (2014), Chang and Wang (2016).
11 Admittedly, energy tax (as product tax) and resources tax are diﬀerent in their ‘de
jure’ taxation purposes and tax designs (e.g. tax bases) (see Milne and Andersen, 2012),
but they bear similar ‘de facto impacts’ in terms of abatement at coal-ﬁred generators,
which is to be explained in Section 3.
12 To avoid ‘double regulation’ in this sense, the above-mentioned European
Commission proposal on restructuring energy taxation also encompassed the diﬀer-
entiation between sectors covered by the EU ETS and those that are not (European
Commission, 2011a, 2011b).
13 ‘Business’ is more concerned with ‘economic activity’, while ‘non-business’ generally
refers to activities that do not generate any income, directly or indirectly.
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ﬁred generation’ is calculated on the basis of data on the ‘emissions
from the coal-ﬁred generation’ from Sandbag (2017) and the ‘electricity
output by coal’ from EEA (2016).
Consequently, coal-power end users in the industrial sectors (if not
in the exempt sectors of the ETD) have to pay ‘carbon costs’ twice for
consuming the same electricity, including both the ‘carbon tax’ embo-
died in the ETD and the ‘indirect carbon ETS cost’ that is embodied in
the inﬂated coal-ﬁred power price. Accordingly, we provided the
quantitative evidence on the ‘double carbon cost burdens of ETS & tax’
in terms of each megawatt-hour of coal-ﬁred power (see Table 4). Ad-
mittedly, this does not constitute double regulation in legal sense, but
the IDR (‘double cost burdens’) or, at the very least, ‘indirect policy
interactions’ will de facto aﬀect coal-power end users’ consumption
behaviors, shape the abatement incentive structures of upstream coal-
ﬁred generators and consequently merits further attention.
While the IDR arises at the consumer level in the EU, similar pro-
blem takes place in China at the side of coal-ﬁred power plants.
As described above, the Chinese resources tax is an ad-valorem tax
imposed on coal plants when coal is sold (see Fig. 3). By inﬂating the
price of coal, the resources tax could be (at least in part) passed onto
coal consumers in general and to coal-ﬁred power generators in parti-
cular. The extent to which tax can be passed downstream depends upon
the ‘market power’ of coal plants and thus largely upon the price
elasticity of demand for thermal coal at coal-ﬁred plants (Frank, 2007;
Griﬃths and Wall, 2008; Perloﬀ, 2008), particularly, in the thermal
coal market. Such an elasticity will be essentially determined by the
extent to which coal-ﬁred generators have the opportunity to ‘respond’
(to the price change in the domestic market) within the timeframe
under consideration. First, since both electricity prices and generation
output remain highly regulated by the government (NDRC, 2015a),
coal-power plants can neither inﬂate the price (on-grid tariﬀ) to pass
down coal costs, nor can they adjust the generation output and thus the
coal use (ceteris paribus, e.g. with a given technique and fuel mix for
generation) (Kahrl et al., 2011). Further, generators can, of course,
Fig. 1. Eﬀective energy tax rates on electricity in the
EU (business use).
Source: European Commission (2016).
Fig. 2. Eﬀective energy tax rates on electricity in the
EU (non-business use).
Source: European Commission (2016).
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Table 2
CO2 emission intensity for coal-ﬁred generation by high emitting countries in the EU (gCO2/kWh) (2010–2014).
Source: Authors' own calculation on the basis of data from EEA (2016) and Sandbag (2017).
EU-28 Germany (DE) Poland (PL) Czech Republic (CZ) Italy (IT) Netherlands (NL) Bulgaria (BG)
2014 981.92 966.07 997.53 1121.59 906.71 868.24 1215.68
2013 981.10 969.11 1002.05 1129.36 908.99 897.86 1232.47
2012 986.17 974.64 1012.09 1131.63 889.28 838.43 1210.88
2011 995.52 994.02 1003.88 1154.52 903.28 808.79 1151.18
2010 1000.70 993.93 1016.01 1165.28 933.71 827.87 1172.26
Table 3
ETS cost burdens by high emitting countries in the EU (EUR/MWh) (2010–2014).
Source: Authors' own calculation on the basis of data from Table 2 and Borghesi et al. (2016).
Average annual EUA price (EUR/tCO2) ETS cost (EUR/MWh)
EU-28 Germany (DE) Poland (PL) Czech Republic (CZ) Italy (IT) Netherlands (NL) Bulgaria(BG)
2014 5.95 5.84 5.75 5.94 6.67 5.39 5.17 7.23
2013 4.46 4.38 4.32 4.47 5.04 4.05 4.00 5.50
2012 8.12 8.01 7.91 8.22 9.19 7.22 6.81 9.83
2011 14.09 14.03 14.01 14.14 16.27 12.73 11.40 16.22
2010 15.25 15.26 15.16 15.49 17.77 14.24 12.63 17.88
Table 4
Double carbon cost burdens (ETS-tax) by high emitting countries in the EU (EUR/MWh) (2014).




0–10,000 kWh 10,000–50,000 kWh 50,000–10,000,000 kWh >10,000,000 kWh




15.37 4.71 1.04 12.5 100.7 49.96 13.31 0.53 1
Double cost
burdens




20.5 4.71 1.04 22.7 100.7 49.96 13.31 1.07 1
Double cost
burdens
26.25 10.65 7.71 28.09 105.87 55.13 18.48 6.24 8.23
Note: Electricity tax in Spain is not listed herein as it has a general ad-valorem tax rate of 5,113% on a base that excludes VAT, except for cases in which this leads to a lower tax, in which
minima apply.
Fig. 3. Resources tax rates on coal and provincial
coal production in China.
Source: Own elaboration on the basis of data from
Provincial Oﬃcial Websites.
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purchase coal from the international market, but such importation re-
mains limited in practice for multiple reasons such as regulatory risk or
ﬁnancial risk, e.g. the limited permits issued for coal importation.
As a result, the price elasticity of demand for thermal coal at coal-
ﬁred generators will be essentially ‘relatively inelastic’, which is also
corroborated by an empirical study of thermal coal consumption
(January 2001-August 2015) that shows the price elasticity of demand
for thermal coal in China is− 0.1397 in the short term and− 0.254 in
the long term (Qiao and Luo, 2016). Due to the inelastic demand, coal-
ﬁred power generators will have to bear a large part of the resources tax
and incur higher coal costs. Because coal-ﬁred generators are also
subject to the Chinese ETS, the IDR will take place at the coal-ﬁred
plants as they will pay both the ‘direct carbon ETS costs’ and ‘indirect
carbon tax’ (i.e. the resources tax that is passed from upstream coal
plants and embodied by the coal cost increase).
Below we present a preliminary magnitude of ‘double carbon cost
burdens’ on coal-ﬁred generators in the 10 largest coal-producing
provinces in China. We examine in particular the two common types of
thermal coal including the bituminous coal-5000 Kcal/kg and anthra-
cite-5500 Kcal/kg (Figs. 4 and 5). Speciﬁcally, the ‘ETS cost burdens on
generators from coal-combustion’ in the future Chinese national ETS
are estimated by multiplying the ‘carbon emissions from coal combus-
tion (tCO2/tCoal)’ and the ‘projected ETS prices (CNY/tCO2)’ (see
Table 5).
3. Mixed eﬀects of the IDR in the EU and China: a
Law& Economics justiﬁcation?
Building upon the proceeding sections, this section presents a
Law& Economics analysis of IDR in both jurisdictions and identiﬁes its
environmental eﬀectiveness and eﬃciency implications. Speciﬁcally,
the incentive structure of coal-ﬁred generators in both systems will be
examined to analyze whether and how such IDR will induce a low-
carbon transformation of the power generation sector.
Diﬀerent forms of double regulation (between the ETS and ‘carbon
tax’) may lead to varied eﬀects, particularly, in relation to whether or
not such a tax covers the ETS-covered entities.
On the one hand, if the carbon tax covers the ETS-covered entities, a
hybrid tax-ETS system enables the regulators to limit the overall
quantity of emissions while inﬂuencing the market price (Weishaar and
Tiche, 2014). But a hybrid system will very likely induce a higher ad-
ministrative burden upon companies and thus give rise to higher ag-
gregate abatement costs in the ETS sectors, which is ineﬃcient. Also,
the installations that fall under both systems pay twice for emitting one
ton of CO2 (double payment), which leads to ineﬃciency if the total
price paid does exceed the ‘social optimum price’ for carbon emissions
(Böhringer et al., 2016). Moreover, signiﬁcant competitive distortions
could arise between those who pay twice and those installations that
only fall under one system. Accordingly, because installations have
diﬀerent marginal abatement costs, the ‘internalisation of emission
externality’ cannot be achieved at least costs. This is ineﬃcient.
Further environmental implication of such a hybrid system
(tax & ETS) is that it does not generate additional emission cuts but
incentivises long-term abatement. This is because theoretically a carbon
tax (or quasi carbon tax) provides a clear and continuous incentive for
abatement by sending a clear price signal and also leads to government
income (Weishaar and Tiche, 2014). But once the cap is set, the cap
under the ETS ﬁxes total CO2 emissions and further tax measures im-
posed on the ETS-covered entities will not result in additional emission
cuts.14 However, in the long term, an ETS is not so eﬀective as to spur
Fig. 4. Double carbon cost burdens by 10 largest
coal-producing provinces in China (Bituminous coal-
5000 Kcal/kg) (CNY/tCoal).
Source: Authors’ own elaboration.
Fig. 5. Double carbon cost burdens by 10 largest
coal-producing provinces in China (Anthracite-
5500 Kcal/kg) (CNY/tCoal).
Source: Authors’ own elaboration.
14 It bears mentioning that if the carbon tax rate is set much higher than the carbon
market price, the ETS will simply be superseded (or even nulliﬁed) by carbon tax.
Admittedly, such a carbon tax will certainly give rise to additional abatement (to the
abatement target within the ETS), but it is rarely likely that policy-makers will implement
such a hybrid ETS-tax system.
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innovation in new low-carbon technologies by itself, mainly because it
cannot provide any certainty about setting (suﬃciently and con-
sistently) high carbon price signal (Capozza and Curtin, 2012; Lecuyer
and Quirion, 2013; Lehmann and Gawel, 2013; Gawel et al., 2014;
Weishaar, 2014a; Zeng et al., 2016), unless certain mechanisms (e.g.
reserved auction prices) are expressly introduced to do so. Since carbon
tax revenues are commonly used to fund R &D programmes or provide
subsidies and tax reductions for the adoption of low-carbon technolo-
gies (Braun et al., 2010; Lanzi and Sue Wing, 2011), the interaction of
the ETS and carbon taxes may have positive impacts on innovation and
thus incentivize long-term abatement.
On the other hand, diﬀerent eﬀects may arise when a ‘carbon tax’
imposes ‘abatement obligations’ on the non-ETS-covered entities.
Speciﬁcally, the current policy mix in the EU and China may generate a
wide variety of explicit and implicit complications. The explicit carbon
price drop – in the wake of IDR – prima facie brings down aggregate
abatement costs. But the implicit distortions of carbon price signal
within the policy mix may complicate the mechanism. Generally, the
use of a second instrument that interacts with the ETS will raise the
overall costs of meeting the emissions cap and thus reduce eﬃciency.
This is explained below.
3.1. Explicit complications of IDR
As presented above IDR arises in the context of coal-ﬁred power at
diﬀerent levels. In the EU it arises at the consumption level while in
China it arises at the generator level. Twofold eﬀects may arise when
coal-power consumers in the EU pay double ‘carbon costs’ (direct
‘electricity tax’ and indirect ‘carbon ETS costs’) for the consumption of
coal-ﬁred power. In the short term, consumers will seek to reduce such
consumption and thereby aﬀect upstream emissions of coal-ﬁred gen-
erators (‘upstream-downstream eﬀect’). Consumers in the EU have
some ﬂexibility in choosing and adjusting their power suppliers.15
Speciﬁcally, they can reduce their coal power consumption in three
main manners.
First, they can contract less carbon-intensive electricity (e.g. gas) in
order to reduce the ‘indirect carbon ETS costs’. The second way is by
switching to renewable electricity that is exempt from energy taxation
to mitigate or avoid the ‘indirect carbon costs’. Accordingly, such an
increasing use of renewable electricity (zero marginal costs within a
certain range) may further reduce spot market prices of power via
‘merit order eﬀect’ (Sensfuss et al., 2008), which will then put more cost
pressure on coal-ﬁred generators. These two ways are practically fea-
sible since electricity suppliers are legally required to disclose to their
(ﬁnal) consumers the source of the electricity they have delivered along
with its environmental impact (in terms of at least CO2 emissions)
(European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2009a). The
third approach is to adopt more energy-eﬃcient ‘energy-related pro-
ducts’ to reduce electricity use. ‘Energy-related products’ refer to those
products that directly consume energy (e.g. vehicles, household appli-
ance such as air conditioning and refrigeration equipment) or inﬂuence
the consumption of energy (e.g. windows and showerheads).
In the wake of a decreased demand for coal-ﬁred power, coal-ﬁred
generators will be in principle incentivized to switch to a more coal-
eﬃcient or low-carbon generation to reduce coal/carbon costs, e.g. by
adopting carbon capture and storage (CCS), the integrated gasiﬁcation
combined cycle (IGCC) or supercritical/ultra-supercritical (SC/USC)
coal-ﬁred generation. Admittedly, such a technique switch could be
quite costly and risky.16 Alternatively, they could inﬂate the power
price to maximize the proﬁts, since electricity demand is generally
believed to be inelastic. But this can only be done to a limited extent.
This is mainly because with the IDR (double carbon costs) being added
to the electricity consumption, real income of power consumers will de
facto decline (i.e. real purchasing power of electricity is falling), ceteris
paribus. Accordingly, electricity demand will be more elastic.17 Coal-
ﬁred generators are therefore incentivized to set the power price
carefully and to consider more coal-eﬃcient or low-carbon generation
techniques.
Still, ultimate decisions should be made based on multiple technical,
economic and regulatory factors that may vary among member states or
even at diﬀerent time (e.g. climatic variations). Major concerns include,
inter alia, the technical possibility of a low-carbon switch, their own
generation costs (coal costs included) and carbon costs, the current
electricity mix and diﬀerent prices by source (merit order eﬀects), along
with the market power of particular coal-ﬁred generators that is largely
aﬀected by the power demand elasticity.
Further, whichever compliance strategy may be chosen by coal-ﬁred
generators, they are incentivized to reduce their aggregate carbon
emissions and thus the demand for allowances will most likely fall,
ceteris paribus. In other words, such a drop will take place with or
without generators’ voluntary abatement eﬀorts. On the one hand, the
adoption of coal-eﬃcient or low-carbon generation technique will
certainly reduce coal-related emissions. On the other hand, assuming
without further abatement eﬀorts, potential decreased sales of coal-
ﬁred power – as a result of power price increase – will discourage the
upstream generation, which will then reduce the coal-related emissions
at the upstream side.
To sum up, the IDR that aﬀects EU's coal-ﬁred power consumers will
reduce the emissions of upstream coal-ﬁred power generators
Table 5
Projected ETS cost burdens on generators from coal-combustion in the Chinese national ETS (CNY/tCoal).

















545 20.37–23.73 26.59–27.02 83.6–99% 0.527 39 75.36
Anthracite –
5500 Kcal/kg
605 22.31–25.87 26.8–27.65 86.1–99% 0.603 39 86.23
Note: Emissions factor in ‘IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories’ is not adopted since the categorization therein (e.g. for anthracite and bituminous coal) is diﬀerent
from Chinese practice (i.e. GB/T5751 categorization).
(footnote continued)
It may be slightly diﬀerent in China since the China ETS appears to implement an ‘in-
tensity-based’ cap that allows for ex-post adjustment of allowances. In this regard, double
regulation in China may contribute to additional emission cuts but to a limited extent. See
Zeng et al. (2016a).
15 Whether and to what extent current consumers (of coal-ﬁred power) in the EU could
lower the consumption depends upon what is written in the contract.
16 In addition, switching to other generation fuels (e.g. gas) could also be costly be-
cause of the rising gas price. See European Commission (2014).
17 Since the income elasticity of electricity (‘necessity goods’) is positive (Frank, 2007,
p. 96, pp. 121–126; Perloﬀ, 2008), the demand of electricity will further drop when
power price increases (‘income eﬀects of IDR’).
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(‘upstream-downstream eﬀect’). At the same time, aggregate emissions
from electricity generation in the power sector will fall. This is mainly
because consumers are incentivized to switch to renewable electricity
with potential exemptions from the ETD or to utilise more energy-ef-
ﬁcient ‘energy-related products’ (to reduce electricity use). Either way,
a more low-carbon generation or a decreased aggregate electricity de-
mand will reduce the overall electricity emissions and thus the demand
for allowances within the power sector.
Consequently, a reduced allowance demand from the power sector
paired with the ‘absolute cap’ of the EU ETS (ﬁxed supply) (European
Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2009b), a decline of the
carbon price is expected which in turn reduces the aggregate abatement
costs (eﬃciency enhanced). However, the indirect interaction of the EU
ETS with ‘carbon tax’ is jeopardizing the environmental functioning of
the ETS. This is because such an overlap did not result in lower emis-
sions but in a lower ETS price. Since a high allowance price is necessary
to incentivize covered entities to invest in technological innovation,
research and development (Weishaar, 2014b), such an interaction in-
evitably undermines the guidance eﬀects of the ETS.
In the long term, further ‘water-bed eﬀect’ may arise from an in-
creased use of energy-eﬃcient ‘energy-related products’. For instance,
carbon emitters in the non-ETS sectors (e.g. service sector, building or
transportation sector) may release fewer emissions with less power
consumed or fewer running hours, leading to further abatement in the
non-ETS sectors. With a ﬁxed trajectory of GHG abatement targets in
the EU (both the ETS and non-ETS included), abatement pressure of the
ETS may be relieved, possibly resulting in a shift of the relative
abatement burden from entities covered by the EU ETS to those that are
not covered. This in turn would take pressure from the carbon allow-
ance price, ceteris paribus.
By contrast, in China, with the IDR (direct carbon ETS costs and
indirect ‘carbon tax’), coal-ﬁred generators face lots of pressure in terms
of reducing coal use and carbon abatement. First, they are directly
covered by the ETS and thus incentivized to abate. Second, they pay
market prices for coal and are most likely to absorb partial resources tax
that is passed from upstream coal plants, mainly because the price
elasticity of demand for thermal coal is relatively inelastic (see above in
Section 2.2). Third, their carbon costs cannot be passed down easily to
downstream grids or consumers due to the ﬁxed and regulated on-grid
tariﬀs. Moreover, coal power generators do not have much leeway in
adjusting the output. As a result, coal-ﬁred generators will be in-
centivized to reduce coal use and abate by, e.g., adopting coal-eﬃcient
and low-carbon generation technology. This enhances the environ-
mental eﬀectiveness. Accordingly, their decreased demand for carbon
allowances will bring down the carbon price over a certain time period.
However, whether such abatement is eﬃcient remains unknown.
Eﬃciency implies that GHG emissions reduction is achieved at least
cost, which is largely inﬂuenced by the stringency of abatement targets
(Weishaar, 2014a; Zeng et al., 2016). For instance, if the allocation to
coal-power plants turns out too stringent and purchasing carbon al-
lowances is not an option (e.g. when the current market price is way too
pricy), they will face too much abatement pressure within a short
period of time. Accordingly, coal-power generators may have to abate
emissions rapidly by investing in the currently available but costly low-
carbon technology, adding to the compliance costs (ineﬃciency) that
could have been saved if they were given enough time to develop more
eﬃcient abatement. Still, it bears mentioning, such pressure may be
relieved in the long term with the ‘co-movement’ mechanism – devel-
oped by China's central government – that allows for partial pass
through of coal cost increases (to the on-grid tariﬀ for coal-ﬁred power)
(NDRC, 2015a).
3.2. Implicit distortions of the ETS guidance eﬀects
Eﬃciency requires the minimization of aggregate abatement costs
to achieve a pre-determined climate change target. This is obtained
when marginal abatement costs are equalized across sectors and emit-
ters, so that reductions take place where they are cheapest to obtain
(Weishaar, 2014a). One way of achieving this equalization is by using
an instrument mix that sets a uniform carbon price for diﬀerent sectors
and allows for trading such as an ETS. In the absence of transaction
costs or market imperfections, the ETS can be considered eﬃcient by
itself (Rey et al., 2014).
In the optimum scenario for the ETS, covered entities make abate-
ment decisions solely based on carbon costs that is reﬂected by a uni-
form carbon price. But implementing additional instruments (e.g. tax)
on the up/down-stream side of ETS entities may distort the carbon price
signal and reduce eﬃciency. For instance, in China, with the indirect
‘carbon tax’ (coal resources tax) passed from upstream coal plants, ETS-
covered entities (i.e. coal-ﬁred power plants) will be encouraged to
invest in low-carbon generation technology that brings the most ‘net
beneﬁts’ – including not only ‘ETS costs/beneﬁts’ but also ‘carbon tax’.
Accordingly, decision making of coal-ﬁred power plants and thus the
ETS guidance eﬀects may be distorted. As a result, aggregate abatement
costs of achieving the prescribed target, assuming all else being equal,
will arise beyond the costs set in the optimum scenario. By contrast,
such distortions will not take place in the EU at the coal-ﬁred power
generators, since the consumption of energy products (coal) for gen-
eration (covered by the EU ETS) are exempt from ‘carbon tax’ (energy
tax) (Council of the European Union, 2003).
Second, the ETS guidance eﬀects may be impaired by the dis-
crepancy in the declared policy objectives of the chosen instruments.
The ETS targets GHG emissions and encourages the development and
use of low-carbon electricity. The tax measures considered in this paper
are not using the carbon content as a tax base and therefore do not
consistently provide incentives to reduce emissions cost-eﬀectively.
Speciﬁcally, on the one hand, the EU ETD reﬂects more concern
about competitiveness and distributive impact than the environment
(European Commission, 2011b). The ETD sets the same minimum tax
rate for the consumption of electricity and only diﬀerentiates between
business and non-business use. It is further carbon neutral as it does not
discriminate between carbon-intensive and low-carbon power (though
exemptions for renewables are available) (Council of the European
Union, 2003; European Commission, 2016). Altogether, through the
‘upstream-downstream eﬀects’, the EU ETD and thus the IDR in the EU
do not favor the low-carbon fossil fuel (e.g. gas) for electricity gen-
eration. On the other hand, the resources tax and thus the IDR in China,
however, favor coal-eﬃcient generation or generators with higher de-
mand elasticity for coal (not necessarily low-carbon generation).
Third, further distortion of ETS guidance eﬀects may arise from
diﬀerent tax rates imposed on equal entities among diﬀerent sectors
and regions, which in turn distort the guidance eﬀects of a uniform
carbon price.18 For instance, similar coal power plants in diﬀerent
provinces face diﬀerent resources taxes in China (see Fig. 3), and the
energy taxes imposed upon coal-ﬁred power in the EU vary sub-
stantially among countries and sectors (see Figs. 1 and 2). Accordingly,
through the ‘upstream-downstream eﬀects’, abatement incentives that a
single ETS price places on coal-ﬁred generators are distorted and
competitive concerns arise as well. Consequently, including the ‘ETS
cost’, Tables 4 and 6 present the potential magnitude of regional dif-
ferences in ‘double carbon costs’, respectively among the 6 highest
emitting countries in the EU and the 5 largest coal-producing provinces
in China, covering around 74% of national coal production). For in-
stance, the associated ‘double carbon costs’ per megawatt-hour of coal-
ﬁred power is 21.12 euros in Germany (business) and 8.23 euros in
Bulgaria (business).
18 Similar negative eﬀects – that arise from diﬀerent environmental taxes rates across
regions/countries – have been examined and referred to as ‘cross-border eﬀects’, e.g. the
unintended trade distorting eﬀects between Northern Ireland (with aggregate levy) to
Ireland (without levy). See EEA (2008) pp. 26–30, 32–33, Weishaar (2009).
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4. Linking the China ETS to the EU ETS: implications of IDR for its
linked partner
Linking the EU ETS to the China ETS appears to promise consider-
able economic and political gains, and both the EU and China expressed
willingness to link (European Commission, 2010a; NDRC, 2015b;
Macdonald-Smith, 2016; Zeng et al., 2016). Particularly, with the U.S.
retreat on climate eﬀorts, EU oﬃcials are looking towards China to
establish an ‘expanded carbon market’ and to reinforce EU's global
climate leadership role (de Carbonnel, 2017). Similarly, China has an-
nounced its intention of ‘participating in global climate governance in
depth’ (State Council, 2016, Section 9). This demonstrates the country's
strong interest in gaining a more prominent role in the area of climate
change. Linking the proposed national ETS to the current world's big-
gest ETS (the EU ETS) will largely serve that goal and China will also
beneﬁt from EU's experience.
Consequently, with the political desirability and a long-standing
cooperation on carbon markets,19 an EU-China linkage is likely to
materialize in the future. A linkage between world's two largest ETSs,
although predicted to be at least seven years oﬀ (Macdonald-Smith,
2016), remains a crucial issue towards global mitigation eﬀorts and
thus merits further attention. However, diﬀerent policy choices be-
tween jurisdictions (e.g. diﬀerent ETS designs,20 double regulation) are
likely to impede a potential linking.
With a hypothetical ‘direct and full linkage’ between both ETSs (no
linking restrictions),21 this section analyzes how the IDR identiﬁed
above in each ETS will aﬀect its linked partner's system and particularly
in relation to the carbon abatement incentives of coal-ﬁred generators.
Speciﬁcally, building upon Section 3, we examine two scenarios asso-
ciated with a raise in the tax measures (i.e. resources tax in China and
the ETD in the EU).
In the case of China, the ‘carbon tax’ (resources tax) that is levied on
coal plants for the coal production/sales will be partially passed on to
coal-ﬁred generators, as the demand for thermal coal is quite inelastic
(e.g. − 0.1397 in the short term). This will then intensify their abate-
ment pressure since generators have already been covered by the ETS.
When the resources tax rate in China increases, coal-ﬁred generators
will have diﬃculties passing cost increases on to electricity consumers
as the on-grid tariﬀs are ﬁxed and heavily regulated. As analyzed in
Section 3.1, they will have to absorb pro-rata inﬂated coal costs and are
further incentivized to employ techniques such as IGCC and SC/USC
generation to increase coal use eﬃciency or directly abate (Yue, 2012).
Ceteris paribus, carbon emissions of coal-ﬁred generators in China will
most likely drop, which will then bring down the demand for allow-
ances and thus put a downward pressure on the carbon price in the
linked ETSs. Given the major role coal plays in power generation in
China,22 abatement of coal-ﬁred generators in China is very likely to
yield sizeable eﬀects on the carbon price in the linked ETSs. Such eﬀects
will be more prominent especially because the Chinese ETS – once fully
implemented – is projected to be around twice the size of the EU ETS
(Swartz and International Emissions Trading Association (IETA), 2016).
Accordingly, those EU-ETS-covered entities (coal-ﬁred generators
included) that are net purchasers of emission allowances will beneﬁt
from such a carbon price decline in the jointed markets. Society as a
whole would also beneﬁt, since a price decline is associated with en-
hanced eﬃciency gains and the abatement target in the EU would be
realized at lower costs. At the same time, however, abatement in-
centives in the EU ETS will be impaired when ‘cheaper’ allowances are
leaking into the EU. In the current market situation, however, this eﬀect
is expected to be limited as abatement incentives are quite limited. The
reason for this is of course the enormous excess supply of allowances
within the EU ETS, leading to price levels that are deemed too low to
incentivize carbon abatement in phase 3 (MacDonald, 2016;
Macdonald-Smith, 2016; Zeng et al., 2016). However, with structural
reform measures (e.g. Market Stability Reserve) and a faster reduction
of the annual emissions cap later on to address the market imbalance
(European Council, 2014; European Parliament and Council of the
European Union, 2015), carbon price may slowly bounce back.23 In this
case, when the EU-China ETSs linkage ﬁnally materializes in the future
– most likely when carbon prices in both ETSs turn ‘positive’ (i.e. prices
to be of inﬂuence on abatement)24 – the IDR in China will have no-
ticeable eﬀects on the EU ETS and particularly on the coal-ﬁred gen-
erators concerned.
By contrast, in the case of a higher electricity tax in the EU, coal-
ﬁred power consumers – that are subject to the double cost burden of
the IDR – will further avoid the consumption of coal-ﬁred power. As
identiﬁed in Section 3.1, this could be done either by switching to re-
newable electricity in order to lower ‘indirect carbon costs’ and po-
tentially reduce the ‘direct electricity tax’ charged, or it could be done
by adopting energy-eﬃcient ‘energy-related products’ to cut the overall
electricity needed. Either way, the ‘upstream-downstream eﬀect’ iden-
tiﬁed in Section 3.1 will be reinforced. That is the decreased demand for
coal-ﬁred power will further reduce the emissions in the power sector
and thus the demand for allowances, regardless of abatement eﬀorts
taken by coal-ﬁred generators in the EU. Also, it bears mentioning that
such an eﬀect may vary signiﬁcantly among diﬀerent member states (or
sectors), as there are strong diﬀerences in the eﬀective energy tax rates
on electricity (‘pre-linking distortions’, see Section 3.2).
Accordingly, along with an absolute cap (ﬁxed supply) in the EU
ETS, the diminished demand for allowances in the power sector will
further bring down the carbon price in the linked systems. This may
give rise to additional beneﬁts of alleviating abatement pressure on
covered entities in both jurisdictions. Despite the power sector is one of
the most carbon-sensitive sectors in China (Li et al., 2012), the carbon
inﬂuence on China's coal-ﬁred power generators remains rather limited
in the short term. This is mainly because, as examined above, power
generators in China can not easily change their output in the short term,
as they are constrained by the heavy electricity regulation. As such,
they do not have so much leeway as their counterparts in the EU to
expand output and take advantage of the lower carbon price. However,
such an eﬀect will be enhanced in the long term, when coal-ﬁred
generators have more freedom in adjusting output25 or with the ‘co-
movement mechanism’ that allows for partial pass-through of coal cost
increase to the on-grid tariﬀ.
19 The on-going cooperation provides a high-level political framework for further
collaboration. See, e.g., the EU-China Partnership on Climate Change (established in
2005, later conﬁrmed in the 2010 Joint Statement and enhanced in the 2015 Joint
Statement); the ‘EU-China emission trading capacity-building project’ (initiated in 2014)
to oﬀer EU expertise. See NDRC and European Commission (2010), European Council and
Council of European Union (2015), para 3,9(5).
20 Main concerns with regard to ETS designs include, inter alia, diﬀerences in abate-
ment targets, transparency and policy inconsistency, robustness of MRV rules and strin-
gency of enforcement within the China ETS. For instance, article 25 of Directive 2009/
29/EC stipulates that future links agreements may be made with compatible mandatory
ETSs with ‘absolute emissions caps’. Hence, the implementation of ‘intensity-based cap’ in
the China ETS may impede a potential EU-China linking. See Zeng et al. (2016).
21 For the deﬁnition of ‘direct’ or ‘full’ linkage, see Haites and Mullins (2001), Sterk
et al. (2006), Roßnagel (2008) p. 396, Tuerk et al. (2009) p. 343.
It bears mentioning we examine the linking scenarios without any ‘quantitative or qua-
litative linking restrictions’ (e.g. ‘quotas’ or ‘border tax’ on the imported/exported al-
lowances).
22 Speciﬁcally, 64% of domestic electricity in China comes from coal in 2016 (China
electricity council, 2017).
23 The current carbon price in the EU ETS, oscillating between €2.97/tCO2 and
€17.79/tCO2 since 2009, is far lower than what policymakers initially envisaged but
expected to bounce back around 2025 (European Commission, 2010b; Macdonald-Smith,
2016; Sandbag, 2017).
24 This remains a precondition for linking, which ensures the abatement target in each
ETS is stringent per se. See Roßnagel (2008), Tuerk et al. (2009), Zeng et al. (2016).
25 The increased ﬂexibility of coal-ﬁred generation in the long term is embodied by,
e.g., a larger value of demand elasticity (for thermal coal) in the long term (0.254) than
the value in the short term (0.1397) (Qiao and Luo, 2016).
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To sum up, an increase in the ‘carbon tax’ in both jurisdictions will
exacerbate the eﬀect of the IDR in both jurisdictions, and give rise to a
carbon price decline. This decline is expected to beneﬁt coal-ﬁred
power generators in the linked partner's system while slightly dis-
courage their abatement. It is also expected that such eﬀects will be
reinforced in the long term, when carbon prices in both ETSs are suf-
ﬁciently ‘positive’ to incentivize investment in abatement technology.
Moreover, with the current electricity regulation in China, the ‘carbon
tax signal’ will be passed from the EU to China's generators at a much
slower pace and to a more limited extent than the other way around.
In the meantime, the pre-linking diﬀerences of ‘double carbon
costs’, imposed on similar coal-ﬁred generators between the EU and
China, will further cause competitive distortions. To compare such
asymmetric eﬀects of ‘IDR’ on the competitiveness between the EU and
China, the ‘double carbon costs’ – imposed on each megawatt-hour of
coal-ﬁred power – are measured in Tables 4 and 6. Speciﬁcally, the ‘ETS
cost per megawatt-hour of coal-ﬁred power (CNY/MWh)’ in China is
calculated based on the ‘standard coal consumption (gCoal/kWh)’ from
China electricity council (2017) and the ‘projected ETS cost (CNY/
tCoal)’ from Table 5. For instance, there exists a diﬀerence of 16.07
EUR/Mwh between Germany (business) and Inner Mongolia (the lar-
gest coal-producing province in 2016 and also applying the highest coal
resources tax rate in China).
5. Conclusions and policy implications
The primary goal of this article has been to enrich the scientiﬁc and
policy discussion on ‘double carbon regulation’ by identifying a serious
issue that has been underrepresented, ‘indirect double regulation’. As our
ﬁndings reveal, it arises from the current carbon regulatory framework
in the EU and China, de facto shapes the abatement incentive structures
of ETS entities (i.e. coal-ﬁred generators) and thus merits further at-
tention.
First, this paper clears up a broad concept – double regulation – that
has been interpreted with multiple-but-ambiguous explanations. We
identiﬁed two categories of ‘direct double regulation’ that have been
discussed in the literature. Double regulation takes place when the
same carbon obligations or mitigation eﬀorts are counted twice, either
at two separate parties under the same regulatory system (e.g. double
crediting between the ERUs and CERs under UNFCCC) or at the same
party under two separate systems (e.g. when carbon tax or energy
measures directly concern the ETS entities).
Second, two diﬀerent forms of IDR are identiﬁed in the EU and
China by scrutinizing legal documents on coal-related carbon regula-
tion and examining abatement incentive structures of coal-ﬁred gen-
erators from a Law& Economics perspective. Speciﬁcally, in the ab-
sence of de jure carbon tax in China or EU widely, energy tax (on coal-
ﬁred power) in the EU and resources tax (on coal) in China – as ‘quasi
carbon tax’ – may de facto constitute IDR in co-existence with each ETS.
This paper further presents the empirical evidence of IDR (double
carbon cost burdens) with a preliminary estimation of the magnitude in
both jurisdictions (see, e.g., Tables 4 and 6).
Third, further mixed eﬀects of IDR are examined for both jurisdic-
tions with an explicit carbon price drop (prima facie eﬃciency gains)
and further implicit distortions. In the EU, IDR takes place at the coal-
ﬁred power consumers, ceteris paribus, reducing emissions from the
upstream coal-ﬁred generation (via ‘upstream-downstream eﬀect’) in
the short term and increasing the supply of allowances within the ETS
(through ‘water-bed eﬀect’) in the long run. By contrast, similar pro-
blem arises in China at coal-ﬁred generators that will then put them
under lots of pressure in terms of reducing coal use and abatement
(Section 3.1). Altogether, IDR – despite at diﬀerent parties between
both jurisdictions – could incentivize a low-carbon transfer of coal-ﬁred
power system, while the seemingly uniform carbon signal may be fur-
ther complicated by implicit distortions (Section 3.2).
In response to the distorting eﬀects of IDR on the ETS guidance
eﬀorts, speciﬁc measures can be taken but should diﬀerentiate distor-
tions by sources.
For one thing, to mitigate distortions that arise from the discrepancy
between the policy objectives of both instruments (‘carbon tax’ and the
ETS), policy-makers can introduce a carbon element into energy taxa-
tion or resources tax, i.e. to tax the electricity consumed (in the EU) or
the thermal coal (in China) more consistently with their carbon con-
tent.26 As mentioned above, similar idea was previously proposed by
the former Finance Minister (Jiwei Lou) in China, and by the European
Commission but withdrawn mainly for competiveness concerns (e.g.
from the diesel industry). By restructuring the existing taxation to a
carbon focus, not only the de-facto distortions from existing policy in-
struments (i.e. IDR) can be largely mitigated, but the legal/adminis-
trative burdens of implementing a new tax item (e.g. carbon tax in
Table 6
Double carbon cost burdens on coal-ﬁred generators in China (EUR/MWh).


































Inner Mongolia 312 545 9% 15.30 1.99 75.36 23.51 3.06 5.05
Shanxi 8% 13.60 1.77 4.83
Shaanxi 6% 10.20 1.33 4.39
Guizhou 5% 8.50 1.11 4.17






Inner Mongolia 312 605 9% 16.99 2.21 86.23 26.90 3.50 5.71
Shanxi 8% 15.1 1.96 5.46
Shaanxi 6% 11.33 1.47 4.97
Guizhou 5% 9.44 1.23 4.73




Note: Data on the exchange rate is taken as in 0.13 EUR/CNY (situation of 2017-5-22).
a ‘Standard coal consumption’ applies to typical plants (capacity not less than 6000 kW).
b Due to the inelastic demand of thermal coal over the period 2001–2105 (Qiao, 2016), we assumed a 100% pass of coal resources tax to estimate resources tax burdens.
26 Legally speaking, this does not constitute ‘double carbon regulation’ as both the ETS
and ‘tax’ concern separate parties.
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China) can also be avoided.
For another, the uniform carbon signal may be further distorted by
de facto regional/sectoral tax diﬀerences among equal entities of both
jurisdictions. It would be mistaken, however, to simply eliminate such
diﬀerences in energy/resources tax, since they may reﬂect other policy
considerations. For instance, as analyzed above, energy tax rates are set
diﬀerently among EU member states largely for competitiveness con-
cerns in the internal (energy) market. It does not necessarily go so far as
to sacriﬁce the competitiveness consideration for abatement purposes,
and the European Court of Justice also adjudicated ‘emissions reduc-
tion’ (as principal objective) must be attained in compliance with other
sub-objectives (competitiveness included) (para. 79 in Case C-505/09 P
Commission v Estonia [2012] ECR, ECLI:EU:C:2012:179). Rather, both
objectives should be taken as a whole so as to minimize unnecessary
regulatory burdens by considering a dynamic carbon-energy market
relationship and trade-oﬀs between policy interests. Speciﬁcally, the co-
existing ETS and energy/resources tax could be collectively subject to
‘proportionality test’ regarding the suitability, necessity and ‘excessive
eﬀects’ (art. 5, Treaty on European Union).
Furthermore, our ﬁndings can be used to complete the competi-
tiveness discussion for the EU ETD, as previous arguments largely
concentrate on the energy market. But as Section 3.2 reveals, the EU
ETD – that was designed to reduce competitive concerns for the internal
(energy) market – may become a source of competitive distortions in
the carbon market.
Additionally, this paper also seeks to enrich scientiﬁc and policy
discussion on ETSs linking by examining the implications of double
regulation for its linked partner (Section 4). Double carbon regulation
remains a concern that has not yet arisen from the current linking-lit-
erature or ETSs-linking practices (e.g. California-Quebec or EU-Swiss
linkage). But if the ETSs linkage is to happen, not only ‘ETS designs’ but
other (carbon) regulatory features (e.g. energy/resources tax) may also
signiﬁcantly aﬀect the abatement decisions of ETS entities (e.g. coal-
ﬁred generators) in the joint ETSs. In the eventuality of a EU-China
linkage, although only likely in the longer term, our ﬁndings suggest
that IDR does serve to alleviate abatement pressure on coal-ﬁred gen-
erators in its linked partner's system while slightly discourage their
abatement.
It may further prove crucial to include ‘double regulation’ into fu-
ture EU-China linking negotiations due to its potentially asymmetric
eﬀects on the competitiveness of both systems (see, e.g., Tables 4 and 6)
and their sizeable share of global emissions. Speciﬁcally, the ‘carbon tax
signal’ may be passed from the EU to China's generators to a much more
limited extent than the other way around. In other words, the joint ETSs
– together with the pre-linking distortions that arise from IDR – are not
providing a level playing ﬁeld in terms of abatement for equal coal-ﬁred
generators in both jurisdictions.
Admittedly, our ﬁndings cannot be conclusive. For one thing, the
qualitative evaluation herein lays the theoretic framework to better
understand the interactive rationale of IDR, with systematic inclusion of
relevant factors (e.g. legal designing details of the ETS/taxes, market
characteristics) that shape abatement incentives of coal-ﬁred gen-
erators. For another, the quantitative evidence herein presents a pre-
liminary magnitude of IDR (e.g. double carbon cost burdens) for coal-
ﬁred generation before and after linking. A better understanding of
dynamic eﬀects calls for future research conducted in both qualitative
and quantitative manner.
Further quantitative ex-ante simulation or ex-post empirical-based
observations will contribute to a statistically reliable sense of the
magnitude of eﬀects. Two major clusters have been employed in the
literature to quantitatively examine policy interactions, and both ap-
proaches may have merits and disadvantages once applied.
On the one hand, bottom-up energy system models (e.g. the
MARKAL bottom-up energy model) concentrate on the energy sector
entirely (see, e.g., Kannan and Strachan, 2009; Qudrat-Ullah, 2013).
Speciﬁcally, the disaggregated data applied may better capture the
regional disparities (e.g. in energy/resources tax, technical possibility
of abatement, electricity mix or State-aid measures) and describe
thoroughly how coal-ﬁred generators among diﬀerent regions react
diﬀerently (‘implicit distortions of IDR’).
On the other hand, top-down sectoral modelling approaches largely
focus upon the ‘interactions of the energy sector with the rest of the
economy’ such as input–output models and Computable General
Equilibrium (CGE) models (Qudrat-Ullah, 2013). For instance, the op-
timization analytical methods adopted could be used to optimize
abatement decisions (of coal-ﬁred plants) endogenously while meeting
the given concurrent constraints of interacted tax-ETS. Hence, it may
prove more feasible (than the bottom-up counterparts) for the EU but
may be less applicable in the Chinese electricity market context, since
optimization generally works best for competitive markets (see, e.g.,
Oikonomou et al., 2008; Fankhauser et al., 2010).
However, it would be mistaken to assume no signiﬁcance for further
qualitative research. Quantitative assessment has signiﬁcant ad-
vantages of estimating the magnitude of IDR. But it tends to focus on
the impacts at a market level as a whole (Spyridaki and Flamos, 2014)
and the design features (e.g. intricate tax designs or energy/carbon
market features) in the ﬁnal outcome may be underrepresented. In this
regard, qualitative assessment may better explain how certain design
feature shapes the ultimate outcome, speciﬁcally, by integrating in-
tricate but often non-quantiﬁable cause-and-eﬀect process and addres-
sing the trade-oﬀs between diversiﬁed policy designs. A ‘multi-criteria
based evaluation’ may further allow for participatory analysis (see, e.g.,
Del Río, 2010; Oikonomou et al., 2010). Altogether, a hybrid qualita-
tive-quantitative analysis of IDR can lead to a greater depth of under-
standing on how the ETS and ‘carbon tax’ interacted in the generation-
consumption chain of coal-ﬁred power, so as to answer the ultimate
question how they might be reconﬁgured to lead to a better mix.
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